Proposed solutions to the problems of this country's health
of the U.S. population) were without health insurance for at least 1 month in ( Families USA, 2008 ). An additional 16 million people (5.4 percent of the U.S. population) are insured, but insuffi ciently to provide adequate protection ( Schoen et al., 2005 ) . Care is uncertain even for the insured: about 20 percent of respondents in a 2007 survey said they delayed or avoided needed treatment during the preceding year ( Rubenstein, 2008 ) . Health care infl ation has outpaced growth in the rest of the economy for the last 40 years; the health care share of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown from just over 5 percent in 1965 to 16 percent by 2005 and is projected to grow to 20 percent by 2015 ( Borger et al., 2006 ) . The share of national health expenditures of publicly funded programs -for example, Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), Veteran's Health Administration, workers ' compensation, and public health -grew from about 25 percent in 1965 to nearly 50 percent currently ( Borger et al., 2006 ) .
The quality of care delivered within the health care system is also believed by many to be in serious trouble. The system is badly fragmented; the majority of physicians practice either solo or in small groups and the seven different physicians, on average, who see each Medicare benefi ciary every year are clinically, fi nancially, and administratively uncoordinated ( Emanuel, 2008 ) . Moreover, patients with chronic conditions consume 70 percent of U.S. health care expenditures, yet the delivery system focuses mainly on acute care ( Emanuel, 2008 ) . Nation-wide surveys indicate that a large majority of Americans are dissatisfi ed with coverage and cost in the health care system: nearly 90 percent believe that the system needs fundamental change or complete rebuilding ( Jacobs, 2008 ) .
Given the complexity of the problems besetting the U.S. health care system, it is not surprising that a wide variety of proposals to reach the goals of cost control, quality improvement, and universal access have been advanced under the rubric of health care system reform. Some have despaired of any possible solution to these problems ( Wells, Ross, and Detsky, 2007 ) . Health care has become a major issue in the 2008 presidential campaign, and the visions of reform posed by the two major party candidates (putative at this writing), Obama (2007) and McCain (2007) , are widely disparate, envisioning increased or reduced regulation of health care, respectively. Whereas some fi nd reasons to doubt that signifi cant reform is imminent because of the resilience of the current system ( Brown, 2008 ) , others are certain of its inevitability ( Relman, 2008 ) .
The proposals for health care system reform fall into three general categories: moving toward some variety of national health system by centralizing health care fi nancing, freeing the health care market from legal and regulatory controls, and blending the two approaches by selecting certain elements from each. In this paper, I will refer to those who advocate the two distinct approaches as central planners and free market 1 advocates , respectively. Driving the two basic positions are opposing ideas: society must be responsible for ensuring access to adequate health care and individuals must be responsible for their own health care (recognizing that many central planners demand some level of personal responsibility and many free market advocates allow for some form of redistributional safety net) ( Goodman, 2001 ) . Various ethical and moral justifi cations for one or the other type of proposal have been offered and it seems likely that the same rationales also underlie mixed proposals for reform, in rough proportion to the elements they have borrowed. Consideration of foundational ethics is therefore relevant to all the proposals for health care system reform.
Both central planners and free market advocates usually present their proposals in terms of their likely effectiveness in achieving the goals of controlling costs, improving quality, and ensuring access to health care. Central planners often reinforce their proposals with ethical considerations, but although sound ethical and moral arguments underlie free market reforms, ethical justifi cation is seldom used to support proposals for free market reforms. My intention in this essay is to offer just such arguments. I do so by sketching some of the ethical thinking that has been expressed by central planners in Section II. In Section III, I present a philosophical perspective that can ground advocacy of free market reforms. On these grounds, I provide a critique of central planning ethics, starting with its crucial fl aw (failure to distinguish between normative and metanormative principles), which leads to injudicious construction of positive rights. In Section IV, I explain why free markets are uniquely capable of achieving the goals that central planners seek but fi nd beyond their grasp. In Section V, I demonstrate the government policy errors that ineluctably have created what many have labeled our health care crisis and then show in Section VI why the experiences of nations that have relied on central planning are more cautionary tales than exemplary models. In Section VII, I discuss the structure of a free market in health care and its implications for public policy and in Section VIII summarize the message of this essay.
In spelling out in some detail the moral and practical basis for preferring the free market approach to central planning for health care system reform, I provide reason for hope to those who despair of this country fi nding its way out of its health care morass.
II . ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF REFORM BY CENTRAL PLANNING
A clear example of using ethical reasoning to justify a certain kind of health care system reform is the process of developing the American Health Security Act by the Clinton administration in 1993 -1994. The idea of adding an ethical component to the administration's plan arose late in its development ( Dubler, 1993 ) . The work of the ethics subgroup of the White House Task Force on National Health Reform was ultimately incorporated into the president's plan in the form of a brief listing of 14 values and principles that the subgroup purported to refl ect fundamental national beliefs. These beliefs included universal access, comprehensive benefi ts, equal benefi ts, fair burdens, effi cient management, and fair procedures ( White House Domestic Policy Council, 1993, 11 -13 ) .
The reasoning behind each of the 14 shared values and principles was thoroughly explicated in a paper published during the congressional debate over the Clinton plan. Dan Brock and Norman Daniels identify four " moral ideals to which our nation is dedicated. Our long held beliefs and highest aspirations about equality, justice, liberty, and community justify this undertaking " ( Brock and Daniels, 1994 ) .
Health is a necessary condition, the authors claim, for individuals to pursue their goals, so health care is a basic requirement of equality . All Americans deserve equal opportunities to pursue their own life goals but, " pain and suffering, disability and limitations of function, and premature loss of life all restrict our opportunities. " Justice is a foundational moral ideal because, despite great variation in philosophical understandings of justice, " nearly all theories imply that it is a serious injustice when individuals suffer preventable loss of opportunity, pain and suffering, or loss of life for want of health care readily available to most inhabitants of a country as rich as our own " ( Brock and Daniels, 1994, 1191 ) . Justice implies other requirements as well; for example, individuals must contribute to basic public goods based on their ability to pay, and goods that are in limited supply must be allocated wisely. Liberty cannot be exercised well when one is threatened by illness or death. With liberty comes responsibility for one's own health, so people should be encouraged to take responsibility, but when they fail to do so by engaging in unhealthy behaviors, they should not be denied health care. The fourth moral ideal is community , which joined us into a single nation. All communities share " concern and responsibility for one's fellow members, especially those in need of help. A national health care system that provides health care for everyone will also help bind us together in a broader national community. " (1192) The preceding discussion refl ected the consensus of the substantial number of bioethicists and other scholars who comprised the ethics-working group of the White House Task Force and as such can be taken as a widely held view of those who support central planning.
The moral foundations of health care services reform were much discussed around the time of the Clinton health care plan in the early and mid-1990s, but interest faded after the plan collapsed in Congress in 1994. Attention to the subject was renewed, however, in the wake of the national political shift to the left after the congressional election of 2006. In recent years, a spate of new ethical analyses has appeared. Daniels has expanded on his earlier work by probing more deeply into such questions as why health and health care are special, what is required to achieve distributive justice, and how society should go about allocating health care resources ( Daniels, 2007 ) .
Rejecting theories of justice as justifi cation for particular reform plans, DeGrazia (2008) takes a pragmatic approach, citing widespread agreement about four goals of health care system reform -universal coverage, cost containment, protection of patients ' freedom, and preservation of high-quality care -as appropriate moral grounds for evaluating health care system and reform proposals. These lead him to propose a mixed system for health care system reform: managed competition, a la the Clinton's American Health Security Act, combined with a national single payer.
An attempt to develop a consensus ethical framework for health care system reform has been offered by the Ethical Force Program, an effort that includes a broad range of participants and is sponsored by the American Medical Association ( Levine et al., 2007 ) . The report fi nds " three core American values " that provide moral guidance for health care system reform: equality of opportunity, justice, and compassion. Those moral guides lead to four ethically required components of health care system reform: universal core health care benefi ts; an ethical process for establishing the contents and limits of health care benefi ts; a sustainable health care system; and clear responsibilities for stakeholders, for which they are accountable.
It is interesting to note that virtually all the proponents of central planning strongly support autonomous decision making by patients in a clinical setting, manifested as the requirement for informed consent. Yet the same scholars deeply oppose autonomous decision making by patients in the public setting, manifested as consumer informed choice, as is advocated by proponents of market-based consumer-directed health care ( Kapp, 2007 ) . This paradox refl ects a signifi cant inconsistency that has not, to my knowledge, been addressed by any bioethical, health law, or health policy scholar or advocate.
III . ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE MARKET REFORM
Free market advocates have advanced various moral justifi cations for strictly limiting governmental functions. They include arguments from richly developed understandings of human nature ( Kelley, 1998 ; Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005 ) , from absence of general agreement on any moral question, requiring that a political system can be based only on voluntary cooperation ( Engelhardt, 1996 ) , and from the foundational presumption that protecting freedom is the primary goal of human society ( Friedman, 1962, 7 -21 ) . I will briefl y summarize the justifi cation of free markets based on a particular understanding of human nature and corollary natural rights theory, then, in light of this thesis and empirical evidence, demonstrate the fl aws in the ethical basis of central planning.
Human Nature and Natural Rights Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991) view human beings and morality through neo-Aristotelian eyes. Their basic assumption is that there is such a thing as human nature and that it can be discovered through systematic observation (32 -40) . Human beings are animals that are conscious and can understand the world by processing perceptions into concepts that refl ect things as they exist in reality. They use their intelligence to solve problems and make choices among alternative actions. The use of conceptual capacity is itself a choice -volitional consciousness is the fundamental distinction that separates human beings from other animals. The defi nition of man as the rational animal is not arbitrary, but is a conclusion reached by the accumulation of a vast number of empirically discovered, scientifi c facts.
The nature of a particular human being is a potentiality that can be actualized, and potentialities are both generic, present in all human beings, and individuative, that is, unique to each individual. Living intelligently is the natural function or end of a human being and is the standard for measuring and evaluating human action. Only the rationally determined choices and actions of a particular individual can realize that individual's unique and generic potentialities and lead to a fl ourishing life.
The requirement for self-realization of the unique potentialities of each individual establishes the need for the concept of moral rights , which exist prior to and therefore constrain legal rights. Moral rights have certain characteristics related to their basis in human nature ( Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 1991, 79 -87 ) . They are subjective in the sense of being possessed by individuals. They belong to every human being; that is, they are universal , unlike rights that arise from a contract or other specifi c obligation. Rights impose duties or obligations on others, and natural rights are negative -they impose a duty not to interfere with the actions of others. Because negative rights originate in human nature, they are natural rights, in the senses of existing prior to any law and being unrelated to membership in a particular community. For these reasons, a legal system must be built upon the foundation of natural rights, and laws must be universally and uniformly applied to all human beings in a social context, irrespective of their personal circumstances or needs. Human beings have the capacity to reason and to choose, and this essential aspect of human nature cannot be relinquished or given away; therefore, natural rights are inalienable -in a political or social context, one cannot lose or waive the natural right that imposes duties of noninterference on others. The fi nal characteristic of natural rights is that they are absolute , in the sense that they override all other moral considerations in specifying one's legal obligations.
The natural right to liberty generates the principle of noninterference: the right to act without forceful interference by others. This is the basis for limiting the scope of authority of governments ( Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005, 268 -83 ) . The right to liberty recognizes that all human beings must pursue their own unique forms of fl ourishing, and that diverse modes of fl ourishing must be respected -that is, there must be no political or legal bias in favor of one particular form of fl ourishing. Moreover, because all persons are obligated to refrain from initiating physical force against others, the right to liberty requires a legal system, embodied in government, to provide and maintain the conditions that permit the possibility of many different forms of human fl ourishing. Such a system must possess and exercise the power to act against those who initiate the use of force. The functions of government are thus necessarily limited to providing courts to settle disputes, police services to protect persons and property against force and fraud, and armed forces for national defense. Government intervention in voluntary interactions among persons and organizations cannot be justifi ed; thus, the concrete expression of natural rights in the social and economic context is the free market. Clearly, this brief summary is barely more than an outline of the moral and legal implications of the idea of natural rights -many criticisms of natural rights and of the particular version I have presented have been raised and answered elsewhere.
3 This concise presentation should be suffi cient, however, to provide the basis for further development of natural rights theory in a critique of the ethics underlying central planning.
The Fundamental Flaw of Central Planning Ethics " Liberalism " generally characterizes freedom as the central concern of politics and law. The term has been applied to modes of thinking as disparate as classical liberalism, which gives primacy to the individual over society, and modern American liberalism, which reverses that hierarchy ( Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005, 5 -17 ) . The decline of liberalism in recent decades has resulted largely from its linkage with the Enlightenment project, combined with the perceived failure of that project; the attack has come from many different directions, most notably by communitarianism, which I discuss further below. Liberalism as a general concept has a critical problem: how to reconcile the two seemingly opposing aspects of human fl ourishing -its individual and its social character. The solution to this problem, given the understanding of human nature described above, lies in the concept of rights in its Lockean negative sense.
The ultimate moral good for people is, as we argued above, a fl ourishing life. Because fl ourishing is individualized and agent relative, no universal standard can properly weigh the virtues and goods that will lead to a fl ourishing life; rather, each person must use practical reason to pursue what constitutes the good life for him. Practical reason (the meaning of phrônesis cannot be easily captured in translation, but is best expressed with this term) is the fi rst among the virtues, because it integrates all the goods and virtues that constitute a person's fl ourishing ( Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 1995, 274 -77 ) . When a choice among alternative actions is at hand, each person must use practical reason to fi nd the balance of virtues and goods that is appropriate for himself at that particular time and under those particular conditions. This process must of necessity be highly individualized. The same process is used in weighing interpersonal relations. Individuals do not value all persons equally; the more important another person is for one's fl ourishing life, the more valued that person will be, and those who are less important in one's life will be valued less.
Because practical reason is fundamentally a self-directed activity, selfdirection is indispensable to human fl ourishing. Every person, therefore, needs protection for the capacity of self-direction if fl ourishing is to be possible. Because of this need, the guiding principle of a legal system must be protection of self-direction of every individual, and it must not require sacrifi cing the fl ourishing of any person or group to any other (Rasmussen, 1995, 276) . The right to liberty, therefore, is a metanormative principle; it provides no guidance as to what is good or what is right, has nothing to say about whether individuals make good choices or bad choices, and is not concerned with whether people actually achieve their own good. A legal system based on the metanormative right to liberty does not permit some to initiate the use of force against others -it permits no one to use individuals for purposes to which they have not consented ( Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 1991, 78 -87 ) .
As metanorms, natural rights do not assume a particular set of shared values and commitments, and they focus on the open-ended nature of social life. Natural rights are universal: all persons need them for their own fl ourishing and everyone can, in principle, fulfi ll them. Thus, the central role of natural rights is to link individual morality with social life; it is grounded in the dual character -individual and social -of human fl ourishing. The concept of natural rights solves liberalism's problem: it reconciles the individual and the social characteristics of human fl ourishing by protecting self-directedness, which is consistent with open-ended social life and moral pluralism, is neutral toward various views of the good life, is intrinsic to all moral activities, and is a necessity for every person (Rasmussen, 1995, 276) .
The fundamental fl aw in the reasoning of central planners lies in their failure to recognize the distinction between normative and metanormative principles. The right to liberty is not normative: it cannot prescribe what is good for any individual or for society as a whole; it cannot, in principle, prioritize for everyone neither the goods of health and health care over other goods nor the virtues of compassion and justice over other virtues. The right to liberty, like all natural rights, is metanormative: it alone can ensure the very possibility of human fl ourishing by protecting self-directedness for every individual. In health care, the right to liberty protects self-direction in the intelligent balancing of the values and goods associated with health with the other values and goods that lead to a fl ourishing life. It also prevents interference by outside agencies -other individuals, institutions, or government -in an individual's interactions and transactions with insurance companies, physicians, or other health care providers. Central planning interferes with all these aspects of self-directedness and thus undermines the human good it purports to advance.
Without Health (or Health Care) We Cannot Be Free
The difference between liberty rights, which are negative, and positive rights is that the fi rst concerns the process of pursuing things of value whereas the second concerns the outcomes of those pursuits ( Kelley, 1998, 63 -90 ) . For example, in the concept of natural rights, the right to life does not guarantee that we will live long or that we will be healthy -it ensures only that no one will harm us physically without our consent. In contrast, the positive right to life means that we are entitled not only to pursue the goods we need to support our lives, but also to have those goods -that is, be given them, whether we have earned them or not -because, the argument goes, we cannot be free -act freely -without them. Freedom involves both the ability to choose between alternative actions and the ability to choose without forceful interference by others. There is a difference, however, between what alternatives are available and the freedom to choose among them. " Whether or not I am my own master and can follow my own choice and whether the possibilities from which I must choose are many or few are two entirely different questions. " ( Hayek, 1960, 17 ) . To put this in concrete terms: A lives in Boston and can choose among several of the best health care facilities in the world for her health care. Her friend, B, lives in rural Walterboro, South Carolina, with only one hospital and a much narrower range of physicians to choose from than are available to A. A and B are nevertheless equally free to make those choices.
The choices one has can be limited in at least two different ways: by eliminating one or more alternatives or by preventing one from choosing among available alternatives ( MacCallum, 1967, 318 -21 ) . A great deal depends on whether the limitation is imposed by the facts of reality or by forceful interference by others. When a fact of reality removes an option, one cannot think of that fact as an obstacle to the freedom to choose that option. For example, if highly trained cyclist C has never been able to sprint at a speed of 40 miles an hour on his racing bicycle on a fl at course, his inability to reach 40 miles an hour is a fact of reality, not a limitation on his freedom to do so. If, however, D is able routinely to sprint 40 miles an hour, but E lets a few pounds of air pressure out of his tires before the sprint, D's ability to sprint at his top speed has been obstructed. E has wrongly abridged D's freedom. Thus, the idea of freedom requires only that the ability to choose among available alternative not be forcibly constrained.
When central planners argue that having certain options, such as health insurance, among one's alternatives provides freedom of choice and that the absence of such options is tantamount to limitation of one's freedom, they ignore these distinctions, and in so doing undermine their arguments. By defi ning freedom broadly, they expand its scope to the point of rendering it meaningless. The concept of freedom is straightforward: it means the unimpeded exercise of choice ( Kelley, 1998, 70 ) .
A Compassionate Society Must Be Benevolent
For many central planners, benevolence arising from compassion comprises an important justifi cation for a centrally planned health care system: " [T]he traditional value of compassion for the least fortunate among us demands attention to the well-known effects of inadequate access to health care on individuals and families … . A compassionate society cannot tolerate such avoidable suffering " ( Levine et. al., 2007 , 16) . Relief for those who live in poverty or have suffered economic misfortune can be provided in two different ways: through private charitable giving or through government relief programs. Private charity is voluntary and is carried out through mutual aid societies, churches, and private charities, whereas government programs are coercive and are carried out using the powers to tax or to mandate that others provide goods or services. The fi rst is a manifestation of the giver's compassion and benevolence, whereas the second is an expression of the recipient's right that places the giver under compulsion to comply ( Kelley, 1998, 96 ) .
Human beings face a wide range of threats to their continuing existence and among these are injuries and disease ( Kelley, 1998, 83 ) . Health care goods and services are created in response to the need to avoid such threats and to alleviate them when they occur. Health care comprises certain components -medications, devices, procedures, and processes -designed to prevent or treat diseases and injuries. Those components do not simply arise in nature; rather, they are produced by the efforts of human beingsphysicians, nurses, research scientists, drug manufacturers, and many others -who must rely on their own productive efforts to gain the values they need to sustain their lives.
Voluntary donation means the donor is free to choose to whom to give and for what purpose the gift will be used. Throughout the transaction, until the gift is completed, the donor is the owner of his own resources. Welfare rights obstruct the freedom of individuals to choose, and they establish that an individual does not own his own resources. Because a positive right is an entitlement, those whose efforts produced the goods and services that constitute health care are obligated to provide them. In effect, the producer is not treated as an end in himself, and the entitled recipient comes to own a small piece of the health caregivers who are obliged to care for him, as well as of the taxpayers who fund the welfare program ( Kelley, 1998, 96 ) . About a third of the U.S. GDP is taken by taxes, of which nearly half, about 17 percent overall, goes to welfare programs. E is a good citizen and she works in order to earn a living. Because of the tax system, 25 percent of her income is coercively taken to support government welfare programs, or, stated differently, as Robert Nozick (1974, 169 -72) pointed out, E spends 25 percent of her time in involuntarily servitude for the benefi t of others.
Coercion of this kind is immoral; government is morally unjustifi ed in deploying its monopoly on the use of force to impose upon the people it serves its own particular vision of the values and virtues that comprise the good life. The power of government must be limited to the protective functions that alone justify its existence ( Sade, 1971 ) . It must protect the right of all persons within its jurisdiction to choose their own values and goals and to choose the means to pursue them. These protective functions include shielding the innocent from the use of force against them, providing a legal framework for enforcement of freely entered contracts, preventing fraud, and establishing procedures for confl ict resolution when disputes cannot be settled by mutual consent ( Engelhardt, 1996, 178 ) . Thus, in health care, the proper role of government cannot be to entitle its citizens to health care. Rather, it must protect the freedom of all persons to pursue their own health and seek their own health care without obstruction by others and to protect the freedom of patients, physicians, hospitals, and other entities to establish and maintain relationships without external interference ( Sade, 1971 ) .
The idea of a positive right to health care is contradictory to the principle that every individual is an end in himself who cannot be used without his consent as a means to the ends of others. Because we are ends in ourselves, our lives, liberty, and fl ourishing are also ends in themselves, and our means to achieve them cannot rightfully be taken from us ( Kelley, 1998, 100 ) . Compassion and benevolence are only a small fraction of the full range of virtues required to live a fl ourishing life. The capability to donate to others requires that resources fi rst be created or produced and that requirement depends upon certain virtues that lead to productiveness, such as integrity, rationality, creativity, and courage, among many others. Compassion and benevolence are certainly virtues, but they cannot be construed as duties that entitle the needy to part ownership of the time and effort of those who are productive. Moreover, charity is not a duty; rather, it is but one value among the many we may choose to pursue. As ends in ourselves, we have the right to weigh how much of our resources we expend on charity in relation to our many other values and to choose which causes and projects we will support. Government has the power but not the moral right to make those decisions for us ( Sade, 1971 ; Kelley, 1998, 118 ) .
Community Gives Us Much; We Must Give Back
Although communitarians are a diverse group, they are united in their opposition to liberalism's central tenet that achieving and sustaining liberty should be the primary concern of the legal system ( Kelley, 1998, 119 -28 ) .
All members of society have a claim on all others, according to communitarians, because they are involved in a common enterprise, and those who are in a position to contribute goods are obligated to do so because of the benefi ts they have gained as members of a mutually supportive community. The very identity of individuals is substantially shaped by unchosen relationships with others who nurtured and educated them, imposing on them unchosen obligations. MacIntyre (1984, 204 -5) expressed the idea in this way:
[I]t is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.
Belonging to a community, therefore, entails that the unchosen goods and values gained from others impose unavoidable obligations on all the community's members. Because individuals cannot exist outside society, any rights they may claim cannot override the needs of society, on the communitarian view. Some have used the term " social contract " to describe the dense web of rights and obligations binding together all the individuals within society. This contract, however, is not one that can be negotiated, accepted, or rejected: it simply exists. In those terms, society resembles a large-scale family, which is concerned with the welfare of all its members and also has a claim on the resources of its members. Despite the obvious similarities, however, important differences between societies and families render the analogy unsustainable: families are bound together by love and personal commitment and know each other intimately. Those bonds are grounds for allocation of family resources and for the setting of concrete rules, but such bonds are entirely absent in societies larger than families or small voluntary societies ( Kelley, 1998, 134 ) .
Communitarian criticisms of liberalism are correct in some particulars, but misrepresent some important aspects. Contrary to the claim that individualists believe " individual agents are fully formed and their value preferences in place prior to and outside of any society " ( Etzioni, 1996, 3 ) , the natural rights view holds that human beings are profoundly social creatures. Individuals nearly always develop and are nurtured within a human community of some kind. Some of our potentialities are oriented toward interaction with others, and we cannot fl ourish without actualizing them. Despite our social nature, however, societies do not exist without the individuals who comprise them, and those individuals are not mere constituents of a living organism -a society has no brain, cannot think, and cannot make choices. It is true that we learn many of our values and behaviors from others, but individuals do the learning and are free to question values and behaviors, rejecting or changing them when necessary or desirable.
We owe much to those from whom we have benefi ted through our participation in society, but not in the way nor for the reasons communitarians claim. We owe our parents gratitude and reciprocal support for all they did for us when we were dependent on them. We owe the giants who created the literature, science, and culture we inherited our appreciation and recognition of their contributions. We owe business and professional associates and others from whom we have benefi ted economically fulfi llment of the terms of our agreements and contracts. When those debts have been satisfi ed, however, no moral residual remains to be demanded by those who want more from us ( Kelley, 1998, 129 -30 ) .
The right to dispose of the wealth of others is based in part on the assertion that wealth is a social product ( Rawls, 1971, 4 ) . The wealth acquired by producers of goods, on this view, is generated by cooperative activities of the many managers and workers who contribute to production, as well as entrepreneurs, advertisers, retailers, and others. The source of the producer's wealth must be considered to be of communal origin, so society is thereby entitled to redistribute at least some of this wealth among its members. The validity of this position depends, however, upon production being truly communal; that is, it must not be possible to identify individual contributors to the chain from production to distribution to sales. But it is nearly always possible to separate out which individuals or groups contributed to which aspects of this process, and how each contribution was valued, in accordance with agreement or contract ( Kelley, 1998, 130 -1 ) . Wealth is not social in origin, but results from the cumulative value of a large number of goods and services produced or provided by identifi able individuals or delimited groups.
There is no doubt that human beings are social animals and require interaction with others to fl ourish. The communitarian vision embraces a society of cooperation and responsibility, and liberalism shares that aspect of its vision, for freedom generates a spirit of genuine cooperation and a spirit of responsibility when people know they cannot forcibly draft unwilling others into supporting unchosen projects. But in failing to recognize the importance to human fl ourishing of self-directedness and voluntariness in social interactions, communitarians create sets of positive rights that require coercive enforcement measures. Policies for redistribution of wealth, entitlements to health care among them, bring with them political power struggles and unintended consequences that ultimately undermine the very stability and solidarity communitarians seek. We will visit this issue in more detail shortly, in Section IV.
Justice Demands That All Receive Their Fair Share
Claims of justice as the basis for an entitlement to health care fail because there is widespread disagreement about the characteristics of the particular kind of justice that applies. Scholars from both ends of the health care system reform spectrum have made this point. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (1996, 375) , a free market advocate, argues, " Loose talk about justice and fairness in health care is, therefore, morally misleading because it suggests there is a particular canonical vision of justice or fairness that all have grounds to endorse … this is not the case. " DeGrazia (2008, 32) , a proponent of a singlepayer system, takes a similar tack: " … the strategy of justifying a health care system reform plan on the basis of a theory of justice is undermined by persistent, deep disagreement, even among reasonable people, about which theory is best. "
Absence of agreement as to what justice is or what actions it requires is neither the only nor the best reason for rejecting the principle of justice as a rationale for an entitlement to health care. From a natural rights perspective, justice, understood as the principle of giving others their due, is an important component of human fl ourishing. As noted previously, practical reason integrates the actions required by the various virtues and the goods that constitute one's individual fl ourishing ( Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 1995, 69 -71 ) . When one interacts with another person, just action requires knowledge of the concrete circumstances of the situation, the character of the other person, and how possible courses of action might be reconciled with the many other actions required for one's own fl ourishing. Just action in response to a given situation cannot be found on a list of ethical guidelines.
The distinction between two kinds of relationship -exclusive and nonexclusive -relative to the demands of justice is often missed ( Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 1995, 68 -71 ) . Exclusive relationships are those with friends and relatives, nonexclusive relationships are those with strangers. The virtue of justice as a basis for a political-legal system is rightfully concerned only with respect for persons ' negative rights. Justice requires much more than this, however, in the context of exclusive relationships, wherein demands of justice might be quite complex, including both positive and negative obligations. In nonexclusive contexts, however, only the principle of respect for negative rights is appropriate, because protecting a person's self-directedness alone is universally required. Our commitment to others cannot require anything more of justice because we all have good reason to respect rights, namely, our need for social life in both the exclusive and nonexclusive senses.
Health Care Is a Special Case
A common misconception underlying the assertion that health care is a social responsibility is the notion that health care is a special human need that is categorically different from other basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter ( Daniels, 2007 ) . Several errors underlie the notion that health care is special -health care exceptionalism. For example, the idea that health care is special is based largely on moral intuitions. Hanson (2002, 154) argues that such intuitions have an evolutionary origin:
[H]umans evolved particular health behaviors and moral intuitions because of specifi c contingent features of our ancestors ' environments, features that are largely irrelevant today. More importantly, evolution has left us largely unaware of how self-serving and in-group-oriented (i.e., favoring our family, tribe, or ethnicity) the functions performed by those behaviors and intuitions were. In general, we distrust especially contingent and self-or in-group-serving moral intuitions. We should therefore consider our health care-specifi c moral intuitions to be less reliable than other sorts of intuitions.
In considering various sources of error in health care intuitions -such as excessive historical contingency of an intuition's origin or self-deception regarding hidden biases toward ourselves and our group - Hanson (2002, 179) concludes that health-care -specifi c intuitions are likely to be unreliable to an extent that is vastly underestimated in the bioethics literature. Rather than trusting those intuitions, he suggests that we might be better off instead to " adopt very simple and general moral principles, such as utilitarianism " .
Another source of misconception about health care as a special human need is an overly narrow understanding of what constitutes health and confl ation of the ideas of health and health care. When people write and speak of the right to health, they often mean the right to health care, but these concepts are not the same. Good health is a consequence of many human activities, such as choosing a proper diet, avoiding dangerous activities -for example, driving too fast -and maintaining fi tness by engaging in regular physical exercise. For most individuals, health care makes only a minor contribution to health, perhaps excepting some whose chronic diseases require continual medical intervention ( Sade, 1995 ) . Moreover, on this view, the goal of leading a fl ourishing life requires striving for many other goals: intellectual development, artistic expression, enjoyment of performing arts, athletic achievement, and many others. To achieve the proper balance of these goals in light of individual talents and preferences, individuals must have the freedom to weigh how to use their limited resources to optimize satisfaction of all of their needs and wants. They do this in order to achieve the best possible life for themselves and for those for whom they have chosen to be responsible. Health is an important value, and, for most people, health care plays only a minor role in achieving health. If health per se were a positive right, then all must be entitled to government provision not only of appropriate health care, climatically suitable clothing, and environmentally healthful shelter but of all other goods that contribute to health, such as a properly balanced diet and exercise facilities to maintain a suitable level of physical fi tness. 4 Clearly, this is neither feasible nor desirable in a free society. There can be no right to health or health care.
IV . WHY FREE MARKETS WORK AND CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES DO NOT
There is no longer substantial debate regarding the greater effi ciency of free markets versus centrally planned or controlled economies. For example, the collapse of socialist countries two decades ago realized the predictions of free market economists decades earlier (see discussion of Mises and Hayek below). The import of those events was described by Alan Greenspan (2007, 12) in this way:
The defi ning moment for the world's economies was the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, revealing a state of economic ruin behind the Iron Curtain far beyond the expectations of the most knowledgeable Western economists. Central planning was exposed as an unredeemable failure; coupled with and supported by growing disillusionment over the interventionist economic policies of the Western democracies, market capitalism began quietly to displace those policies in much of the world. Central planning was no longer a subject of debate. There were no eulogies except in North Korea and Cuba. It was dropped from the world's economic agenda.
Recent evidence of the power of economic freedom comes from a University of Texas at Dallas study, which measured 10 components of government policy in 26 industrialized countries and growth in GDP ( Scully, 2008 ) . The conclusions were that more economic freedom correlated positively with higher rates of economic growth, a surrogate measure for standard of living, and that the greatest economic benefi ts accrued to the lowest income earners. In another study, the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom compared 157 countries on the basis of 10 measures of freedom that comprise the index and found that economic freedom correlates highly with per capita income. The quintile (20 percent) of countries with the most economic freedom had fi ve times the per capita income of the bottom quintile ( O'Grady, Feulner, and Holmes, 2008 ) . Similar results were found in the most recent release of the annual Economic Freedom of The World report ( Gwartney and Lawson, 2007 ) . States of the United States show a similar pattern: among U.S. states in 2000 -2005, there was a direct correlation between economic freedom (lower taxes, less government, more fl exible labor markets) and economic growth ( Karabegovi and McMahon, 2008 ) . Classical liberal economists from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman defended free markets not only because they are instrumentally effective and effi cient but also on moral grounds: markets support individual freedom and respect the decisions individuals make when they choose among competing goals and values ( Gaus, 2003 ) . But abstract morality comprises insuffi cient grounds to adopt one variety of human interaction over another if it fails in the crucible of real-world activities. In this section and the next two, I move the discussion from the abstract to the concrete, arguing that a free market in health care goods and services will predictably succeed, as it does in national economies, whereas centrally planned health care systems have failed to achieve their goals in the past and are likely to continue to fail in the future.
The debate about health care system reform originated partly in socialist criticisms of the capitalist system. The criticism took two forms. First, free markets are intrinsically immoral, because private property gives capitalists power over workers, resulting in unequal power relations that lead to systematic social repression. I will return to this criticism shortly. Second, market capitalism must fail as an economic system because unregulated capitalism is chaotic and wasteful and ultimately cannot lead to prosperity ( Gaus, 2003, 61 ) . Order and prosperity will come only when society is organized through central management.
We must know in advance how much labour to assign to the various branches of industry; what products are required and how much of each it is necessary to produce; [and] how and where machines must be provided. These and similar details must be thought out beforehand, with approximate accuracy at least; and the work must be guided in accordance with calculations … without a general plan, without a general directive system, and without careful calculation and bookkeeping, there can be no organization. (N. I. Bukharin and Preobra Zhensky, 1969, 114-15, quoted by Gaus, 2003, 62) Beginning in the 1920s, Ludwig von Mises challenged the fundamental ideas of socialism with arguments that led to what became known as the " Socialist Calculation Debate " between liberal and socialist economists. The debate centered on Mises ' assertion that administrators in a socialist system cannot rationally plan economic activity ( Meadowcroft, 2003, 312 ) . He argued that socialism could never be achieved and that attempts to maintain such a society would lead ultimately to failure of the economic system and social disintegration.
Mises rested his argument on the absence of a mechanism for the effi cient allocation of resources in a socialist economy. Failure to allocate resources where they are most needed will inevitably result in either overproduction or shortages of some goods and services, and many of the goods produced will cost far more than their utility. Therefore, a socialist economy will ultimately collapse. In a free market economy, Mises argued, effi ciency and allocation of resources are guided by prices, which ensure that the many factors of production will be used effi ciently. One cannot make economic calculations without a price system and one cannot have a price system without a market ( Mises, 1936, 113 ) .
Prices are indispensable to knowing the relative value of consumer goods and production factors, as well as capital goods, such as offi ces, factories, and manufacturing equipment. The generation of market prices for capital goods requires that the means of production be transferred between different owners and different uses. Government ownership or control of the means of production prevents such transfers, making it impossible to know their value in the process of producing of consumer goods. In other words, when private property and prices do not exist, central planners have no way to allocate resources rationally. This idea was borne out later when Soviet planners found it impossible to track and set prices effectively ( Smelev and Popov, 1990 ) .
The most serious attempt to refute Mises ' argument was the idea of " market socialism, " a system of quasi-prices in which central planners could set prices for the factors of production. The production of consumer goods would be guided not by producers ' pursuit of profi t but by the planners ' perceptions of consumer preferences and needs. Thus, it was believed that bureaucratic simulation of a capital market would increase effi ciency and correct market failures ( Meadowcroft, 2003, 314 ) . The fl aw in this solution was that assignment of arbitrary prices by central planners might sometimes accurately refl ect the relative value of goods and services, but often would not. Because there would be no knowledge of whether prices had been correctly set -this can be accomplished only in a free market -the result would be oversupplies or shortages of various goods, and ultimately, economic collapse.
Starting in the 1940s, Friedrich A. Hayek built upon Mises ' insights, taking the epistemological position that prices do not refl ect objective value, rather, they refl ect perceptions expressed by large numbers of individuals in a market. Economic calculation cannot be reduced to a set of equations, he asserted, because the knowledge underlying such calculations is the sum of countless perceptions of individuals in the market. When there is no market, knowledge of individual preferences -both recognized and unrecognized --simply would not exist and would therefore not be available for economic calculation ( Hayek, 1948 , 77; Hayek, 1978 ) .
When there is no well-functioning market to generate prices, even the most brilliant planners must, of necessity, operate in ignorance, resulting in grossly ineffi cient allocation of resources and consequent failure to achieve the goals of a set plan. Once the idea of a centrally planned system has been widely accepted, however, each failed plan will generate a corrective plan, which will fail like the one that preceded it, and generate its own successor plan:
If the government, faced with this failure of its fi rst intervention, is not prepared to undo its interference with the market and to return to a free economy, it must add to its fi rst measure more and more regulations and restrictions. Proceeding step by step on this way until it fi nally reaches a point in which all economic freedom of individuals has disappeared ( Mises, 1947, 23 ) .
The consequences of attempting to centrally manage an economy, as predicted by Mises and Hayek, were clearly demonstrated in the second half of the 20th century, most dramatically by the collapse of European socialist economies in the 1980s and 1990s. Mises described a cycle generated by coercive interference with a free market economy, which I will hereinafter call the Misesian cycle: identifi cation of a problem generated by a coercive policy, corrective laws and regulations, unanticipated adverse consequences, identifi cation of the consequences as problems, more corrective laws and regulations, and so forth. This cycle is well illustrated by the history of the U.S. health care system, to which I turn next.
V . HOW U.S. POLICY CREATED THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS
The fi rst federal law addressing health care created The Marine Hospital Service in 1798 (The NIH Almanac). Its purpose was to provide relief for sick and disabled seamen. Several laws modifying this act, including its name change to the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service in 1902 and to the Public Health Service in 1912, were passed in subsequent years. Despite the enactment of social health laws in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, the U.S. government had little further involvement in delivering or fi nancing health care in the United States until the 1940s ( Butler and Haislmaier, 1989 , 4 -5) .
The Creation of Perverse Incentives
Until the late 19th century, medicine could do little to help the sick and disabled, and most of the sick were cared for at home, hospitals being the place where the sickest were cared for. With the development of more effective means of treating diseases in the late 19 th century, hospitals became the dominant source of health care for most people ( Starr, 1982, 145 -79 ) . In the 50 years between 1873 and 1923, the number of hospitals in the United States grew from 149 to 6830 ( Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 , 1975 Concise Dictionary of American History , 1983, 468 -9 ) . The source of funding for most of these new hospitals was local and regional governments, religious organizations, and charities. Before 1930, out-of-pocket payment for medical expenses accounted for 80 -90 percent of health care, and most of the remainder came from government funding or private charity.
The fi rst effective hospital plan was created at Baylor University Hospital in 1929; it required subscribers to pay a set fee of six dollars a year, in exchange for which they received up to 21 days of hospital care ( Starr, 1982, 295 -306 ) . This idea spread to other hospitals, including groups of hospitals, so the number of enrollees increased and hospital incomes became more stable. Such a group of nonprofi t hospitals was created in Sacramento California in 1932 under the name of Blue Cross ( Starr, 1982, 306 -10 ) . The benefi t of this arrangement to patients was that most of their health care expenses were predictable; there were also problems, however. In focusing on front-end coverage, insurance paid for a specifi ed number of days of hospitalization, so some of the most seriously ill patients were fi nancially at risk. As technology advanced over the next decades, the likelihood of longer hospitalizations became a serious problem for many patients. More importantly, payment for health insurance benefi ts was, and still is, quite different from other kinds of insurance. Most types of insurance are indemnity plans, in which an unanticipated loss is reimbursed by a specifi c sum of money. Hospital insurance, however, provides service benefi ts, in which specifi c services are paid for, irrespective of cost (at that time). Thus, the policyholder has little incentive to be concerned about the cost of health care services, and the provider of services has a great deal of incentive to increase costs ( Butler and Haiselmaier, 1989 , 6 -13) .
Enter Government Intervention
By the mid-1930s, market forces had created the foundation of what was to become the dysfunctional health care system of today. Patients preferred insurance that paid for whatever it took to fi x their health problems rather than reimbursing a fi xed amount; hospitals, knowing that cost was not important to patients, could provide any required service and expect full payment without complaint. We do not know what kind of corrections the relatively free market that created this future problem would have made because, beginning in the mid-1930s, a series of government interventions in the health care market were undertaken, interventions that led the health care economy more and more deeply into a morass.
The fi rst of these interventions was an attempt by state governments to protect consumers and to encourage fi nancial stability by subjecting hospital plans to the same requirements as other kinds of insurance companies, such as maintenance of reserve funds to cover unexpected large claims. Blue Cross sought and gained exemption from these regulations, initially in New York in 1934, in exchange for its agreement to sell insurance to anyone seeking it and to charge lower rates than commercial insurance ( Starr, 1982, 297 ) . Blue Cross later also obtained exemption from federal taxes. Shortly after this, physicians established Blue Shield plans to cover their services, in tandem with Blue Cross. Blue Cross and Blue Shield had great advantages over other commercial insurance companies, so became the dominant health insurers in the nation. As a result, great pressure came to bear on other companies to structure their health insurance policies like Blue Cross and Blue Shield. Eventually, hospitals were reimbursed for their services on a costplus basis: they were paid for their actual operating costs, plus a negotiated percentage of the hospital's working and equity capital.
Perverse incentives were now fi rmly in place. A hospital had a powerful incentive to increase its profi t (or excess of revenue over expenses in the case of nonprofi t hospitals) not by decreasing costs, but by increasing costs. The hospital did better fi nancially if it expanded its services and its facilities, almost regardless of the demand for them ( Goodman and Musgrave, 1985 ) . Patients were virtually unconcerned with prices and costs because health insurance paid most of the bills; their health care was essentially paid for in advance.
Federal regulations cemented this dysfunctional system in place with two decisions in the 1940s. Wage and price controls during World War II prevented employers from increasing wages to attract needed workers, so, instead, they increased noncash benefi ts, health insurance in particular. In 1943, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that health insurance purchased by an employer could be deducted from taxable business income and that workers did not have to include that benefi t as taxable income. Health insurance thus became a huge tax dodge for both employers and employees. Incentives for workers and their unions to demand ever greater amounts of employer-provided health insurance were increased further in 1948 when the National Labor Relations Board ruled that health insurance benefi ts were a legitimate bargaining chip in labor-management negotiations ( Butler and Haiselmaier, 1989 , 10) .
As employer-based health insurance grew in the 1950s and 1960s, it became clear that the elderly and the unemployed were not benefi ting from the tax advantages afforded employees. Political pressure to address these problems grew, resulting in enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. They perpetuated the fl aws and biases of the health care fi nancing system that had been built in the 1930s and 1940s: hospitals were reimbursed at " reasonable cost " of treating patients and the " reasonable and customary " standard for physicians remained in place. These reimbursement policies had been infl ationary since their start, and they intensifi ed health care cost infl ation. The cost overruns of Medicare and Medicaid were massive. The government's response to huge health care cost infl ation was, as suggested by the Mises-Hayek analysis, imposition of more regulations and price controls ( Butler and Haiselmaier, 1989 , 19) . Efforts to control costs were directed at both patients and providers, mostly at the latter because it was politically more palatable. The Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act of 1973 encouraged the development of HMOs, which were designed to control health care costs with cost-limiting incentives to physicians and with limits on patients ' demands for expensive services and choice of particular physicians. The Act preempted state laws that discouraged development of HMOs and provided HMOs with capital resources through grants and loans. The law succeeded in growing the number of HMOs from 1971 (26 plans with 3 million subscribers) to 1990 (over 700 plans with tens of millions of enrollees) ( Butler and Haiselmaier 1989 , 21) . Excessive growth in health care costs slowed for a few years, but then resumed annual rates of growth that were two to three times higher than general infl ation by the late 1990s.
To continue the assault on health care cost infl ation, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 established a certifi cation system to limit overexpansion of health care facilities. The law recognized that " a massive infusion of federal funds into the existing healthcare system " had resulted in severe distortion of the health care market by " contributing to infl ationary increases in the cost of health care " ( Barnes, 2006, 2 ) . The resulting quagmire of political maneuvering and bureaucratic confl ict resulted in repeal of the Act in 1982. By then, however, every state had an active Certifi cate of Need (CON) law. After federal repeal, 14 states eliminated CON, but 37 states retain them today. As a tool for central planning, CON laws were and continue to be a failure. They protect health care infrastructure poorly, control costs marginally if at all, and have not increased quality of services as hoped, by concentrating volume at specialty hospitals ( Barnes, 2006, 14 ) . In addition to these failures, they have had the perverse effect of reducing access to modern health care facilities ( Barnes, 2006, 15 ) .
Continuing its attempt to control costs, the federal government did away with cost-plus hospital reimbursement by Medicare and Medicaid with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. TEFRA created diagnosisrelated groups (DRGs), which Medicare uses to reimburse hospitals a fi xed amount for each DRG. Thus, if a hospital keeps its costs below the fi xed reimbursement level, it keeps the difference, but, if its costs are greater than the DRG reimbursement, the hospital must absorb the cost. The DRG system provides incentives to control costs, but, because it is not part of a competitive market, its fl aws are the same as any price-fi xing arrangement: if the price for a DRG is set too high, the incentive is to provide too many medical services; if set too low, the incentive is to provide too few ( Goodman and Musgrave, 1992, 302 ) . Moreover, early discharge of patients to " skilled nursing facilities " that were poorly equipped to care for them resulted in excess deaths ( Sager et al., 1989 ) .
The most invasive and sweeping changes in the health care system to date were instituted in 1996 with the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) Act of 1996. Among many other goals, the law was designed to improve effi ciency in health care delivery by standardizing electronic exchange of patient health, administrative and fi nancial data, protect the confi dentiality and integrity of " individually identifi able health information, " and establish unique health identifi ers for individuals, employers, health plans, and health care providers. More than a decade after passage of the law, improved effi ciency at any level has yet to be demonstrated. Yet, HIPAA has had many unintended adverse effects on clinical research ( Wilson, 2006, 313 -6 ; Ness, 2007 Ness, , 2164 and on patient care, due to fear of violating HIPAA, failure to understand HIPAA's complex and ambiguous privacy regulations, and ethical concerns ( Touchet, Drummond, and Yates, 2004, 575 -6 ) .
Despite the passage of these laws, intended in large part to control the cost of health care, the disproportionate rise in costs continues unabated: costs reached 16 percent of GDP in 2005 and are projected to reach 20 percent by 2015 ( Borger et al., 2006 ) . These laws did little to achieve their objective of cost control, but they created an intrusive bureaucracy, hundreds of thousands of pages of federal regulations, and mountains of mandatory paperwork for physicians and hospitals.
Current Status of U.S. Health Care System
The basic structure of health insurance as it exists today in the United States was created in the 1930s and 1940s. As Mises and Hayek predicted, government policy has created a health care system that has grown progressively more dysfunctional, as cost and quality problems are addressed by new policies that do not repair the problems. The U.S. government (and, increasingly, many state governments) generate still more policies and more unintended negative consequences in a Misesian cycle. This cycle has resulted in what Emanuel and Fuchs (2008) have called " The perfect storm of overutilization, " created, on their view, by the confl uence of seven factors, four physician related and three patient related. Most of those resulted from the ineluctable effects of the Misesian cycle.
At its root , the source of the U.S. health care system's dysfunction is that health care insurance, unlike other kinds of insurance, does not spread risk, but is a means of tax avoidance on income spent for routine health care (Goodman, 2005) . The perverse incentives for both providers and consumers (patients) are now built into the system; they are the primary drivers of health care price infl ation. Third-party payment for health care rose from 34 percent of health care expenditures in 1950 to 62 percent in 1972, and now is over 87 percent ( Herrick, 2006 ) . Because patients pay out-of-pocket only 13 percent of their health care bills, they buy health care effectively at an 87 percent discount. Health care is prepaid and seems nearly cost free to U.S. citizens, and this has led many, even among the wealthy, to feel that health care is an entitlement.
The fundamental cause of health care price infl ation can be succinctly stated in a single sentence: Americans are not prudent buyers of health care because when they make purchasing decisions, they do not have the perception that they are spending their own money. If free market health care system reforms were adopted, people would come to understand that they are spending their own money on health care and would be more circumspect about how their money is spent. Then, as in most of the rest of the economy, their broadened choices and cautious weighing of price and quality in purchasing goods and services would force hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers to compete on the basis of convenience, price, and quality. That this is likely to happen has been demonstrated recently in the essentially unregulated international " medical tourism " market, in which people buy complex health care with their own money. The result has been a rapidly growing market in which patients have found high-quality care at relatively low prices ( Herrick, 2007 ) .
Thus, we see that the logic of Mises ' and Hayek's criticism of central planning is playing out in the U.S. health care system, although the system has not yet reached the advanced stage the Eastern European socialist states were in when they collapsed two decades ago. Meadowcroft (2003, 317) relates the inevitable decline of economies in socialist nations to the decline of bureaucratic systems (such as health care) in capitalist economies in this way:
[The] planned economies [of Eastern European socialist states] were only able to survive for so long because they fl oated on a sea of market prices, [which] planners could borrow … to calculate the cost of alternative processes … . The planned economies of the 20 th century, then, were analogous to the state bureaucracies of capitalist nations: they were able to function only so far as they utilized prices generated by the market … . While state bureaucracies are able to function within capitalist economies, the larger these bureaucracies become the further the economy moves away from effi ciency: the more members of society work for a non-market wage, the more goods and services are exchanged at a non-market price, then the less those prices that do exist accurately refl ect relative value and the more the economy slides toward ineffi ciency and impoverishment.
We have been witnessing this process in the U.S. health care sector for the last 40 years. Similar problems have occurred in health care systems of other countries, yet many central planners use the experiences of other countries to bolster their policy proposals. Those experiences might not be as positive as they are portrayed, however, as we shall observe in the next section.
VI . THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES DO NOT SUPPORT CENTRAL PLANNING
Supporters of central planning of health care fi nancing and delivery often compare the U.S. health care system with those of other countries -most of which have a centrally designed and, to a greater or lesser extent, centrally managed health care system -to show how those countries have solved problems that still plague the United States. 5 A growing body of evidence, particularly in the economics literature, suggests that many of these comparisons are fl awed.
The United States Spends a Greater Share of its Gross Domestic Product on Health Care Than Any Other Country ( Ginsburg et al., 2008 ) In 2005, 15.3 percent of the U.S. GDP was spent on health care, compared with an average of 9.0 percent for countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Great variability among nations in their accounting practices, however, makes comparison of expenditures highly unreliable and misleading. For example, the OECD attempted to harmonize national accounting methods in 2000, but found that the choice of price adjustment methodology can change hospital expenditure estimates by as much as 400 percent ( Schreyogg et al., 2008 ) .
Rather than focusing on monetary measures, examining utilization of real resources is likely to be more instructive ( Anderson, Frogner, and Reinhardt, 2007, 1481 -9 ) . The median OECD country utilizes more physicians, hospital beds, nurses, and hospital days per capita than the United States. Also, over the last 40 years, the average annual rate of growth of real per capita U.S. health care spending has been no higher than the OECD average -4.4 versus 4.5 percent ( Anderson et al., 2000 ) .
Most importantly for cost analysis, the economic costs of waiting for care, in terms of sick pay, lost productivity, and negative health consequences, have been ignored. For example, in Canada, the average wait from referral to treatment is 18.3 weeks ( Esmail and Walker, 2007 ) . In the United States, waiting time is usually measured in days. Long waiting lists are also found in the OECD countries ( Hurst and Siciliani, 2003 ) . The cost of waiting -including sickness benefi ts, social welfare expenses, and medications -can exceed the cost of treatment. These costs are rarely included in calculating the overall costs of a national health care system.
[T]he Difference in the Costs of Health Care Administration Between the United States and Canada is Clearly Large and Growing ( Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein, 2003 ) According to the Congressional Research Service, administrative costs are private insurance 10 percent, HMOs 12 percent, and Medicare 2 percent. These data have been used to argue for a single-payer system modeled on Medicare ( Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein, 2003 ) . However, the estimates include neither the costs of tax collection to fund Medicare nor the hidden shifting of costs to providers. When these factors are included, Medicare and Medicaid spend half again more on administration than private insurance -$0.27 versus $0.16 for every dollar of benefi ts ( Litow, 1994 ) .
If the United States adopted the Canadian system, Woolhandler and Himmelstein estimate, the savings on administrative costs could pay the entire bill for insuring the uninsured ( Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 2002 ) . Their estimates are completely unreliable, however, because they ignore the cost of collecting taxes. When these costs are included, the administrative costs of a universal Medicare program would be double those of a universal private system ( Zycher, 2007 ) .
[H]ealth in the United States is No Better Than in Other Industrialized Countries, and in Many Cases is Clearly Worse, Despite the Higher Level of U.S. Expenditures ( Ginsburg et al., 2008, 63 ) Infant mortality and life expectancy are nearly always cited in arguments aiming to denigrate the U.S. health care system. Both infant mortality and life expectancy in the United States, however, vary enormously across geographic areas and demographic variables. Great variation in the defi nition of a live birth in different countries accounts for much of the low ranking of the United States. Moreover, when stratifi ed by birth weight, U.S. infants have a high likelihood of survival ( Eberstadt, 1995, 43 -73 ) . Lifestyle choices have much greater effects on longevity than do differences in access and quality of health care ( Manchester and Topoleski, 2008 ) .
Outcomes for diseases such as cancer and hypertension depend much more than infant mortality and life expectancy on access to quality health care, so are a better measure of quality. Five-year survival of all types of cancer is higher in the United States than in Europe: In 2000 -2002, U.S. women survived breast cancer at a rate of 90 percent, compared with 79 percent for European women. The U.S. men survived prostate cancer at a rate of 99 percent, compared with 78 percent for European men ( Verdecchia et al., 2007 ) .
In Europe compared with the United States, the incidence of hypertension is 60 percent higher and the slope of the hypertension-advancing age curve is steeper. This might be explained by the higher United States spending on prescription drugs ( Staessen, Kuznetsova, and Stolarz, 2003 ; Wolf-Maier, Cooper, and Banegas, 2003 ) . Indications that health outcomes in the United States are equal or better than those in Europe raise the question of whether the United States spends too much on health care or other countries spend too little .
[U]ninsurance Caused 101,000 Excess Deaths Since the Start of the Decade, Including 16,000 Deaths in 2006 ( Dorn, 2008 ) Reports from the Institute of Medicine in 2002, the Urban Institute in 2008, and Families USA in 2008 place annual mortality due to lack of health insurance at 18,000, 22,000, and 26,260, respectively ( Institute of Medicine, 2002 ; Dorn, 2008 ; Families USA, 2008 ) . These reports are deeply fl awed, because they do not refl ect analysis of actual data from the target years. They all used the same method to reach their conclusions: extrapolation from 15-year-old estimates that used 37-year-old data and employed questionable methods ( Gorman, 2008 ) . Moreover, the argument that the uninsured are more likely to die or have complications of illnesses is much less fi rmly established than studies in the medical literature have suggested; analysis of studies by economists suggest, to the contrary, that " insurance has a relatively small effect on health " ( Hadley and Holahan, 2003 , w3250 -65) .
Even the number of uninsured and the health outcomes of being uninsured are far from clear. The number of uninsured measured in a point-intime snapshot is probably over 40 million as measured by several agencies ( Chockley, Pirani, and Kushner, 2006 ) , but being uninsured is usually a temporary state: 75 percent of uninsured periods last for a year or less and 91 percent last 2 years or less ( Mills and Bhandari, 2003 ) . Moreover, about 25 percent of the uninsured can be considered insured de facto , because they are eligible for publicly funded programs, such as Medicaid and SCHIP, and usually can enroll in those programs at the time of treatment ( The Uninsured in America, 2003 ) . About a third of the uninsured live in households with annual incomes in excess of $50,000, and, of those, more than half had incomes more than $75,000. This suggests that these individuals or families are uninsured by choice ( DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2007 , 21) .
[T]he United States Lags Seriously in Implementation of EMR Systems in Offi ce Practice ( Ginsburg et al., 2008, 63 ) A study showing that U.S. physicians are much less likely than physicians in other countries to have electronic medical record (EMR) systems in their offi ces has been widely quoted to show the superiority of other countries ' systems. For example, in the Netherlands, 98 percent of primary care physicians have EMR systems, compared with a rate in the United States of only 28 percent (Schoen et al., 2006) . This statistic is only part of the picture, however. Physicians in the Netherlands are well behind U.S. physicians in electronic access to hospital records (11 versus 40 percent, respectively) and in electronic ordering of laboratory tests (11 versus 22 percent) (Schoen et al., 2006) .
Information technology (IT) is heavily used in U.S. health care systems in which third-party payment is not a factor, such as walk-in clinics, telephone consultation services, and hospitals competing for medical tourism ( Goodman et al., 2008, 13 -14 ) . Underutilization of IT is likely to be caused by the third-party payment system because the expense of installation, maintenance, and utilization of IT falls upon providers while the benefi ts accrue to patients and third parties ( Goodman et al., 2008, 13 ) . It is relevant to note that in the United States, both the Veteran's Health Administration of the Department of Veterans Affairs, a government agency, and Kaiser Permanente, a private insurer, have sophisticated IT systems. In these public and private systems, the insuring entity benefi ts from the use of IT, so it makes economic sense for them to expend resources for their own gain.
Comment
The medical literature contains laudatory, sometimes hyperbolic, descriptions of the advantages foreign health care systems have over the U.S. system; these descriptions usually do not accurately refl ect reality. Health care in the United States is in many ways superior to more socially oriented systems. It does not excel as it would however, were it not handicapped by a decidedly mixed health care market that is heavily encumbered by overregulation engendered by irrational policy making for more than six decades. Our national legislators and executives now face two fundamental choices in reforming the health care system. Reforms that recognize and exploit the rationality and effi ciency of free markets are most likely to optimize access to health care, control costs, and ensure quality, while advancing the freedom Americans have always valued. Alternatively, reforms created by central planning will inevitably continue the Misesian cycle of the last 60 years, creating new sets of problems similar to those experienced by other countries: rationing by waiting, decreased innovation and underutilization of innovative technologies ( Cherry, 2005 ) , and massive administrative overhead costs. Although central planning might satisfy the moral sentiments of well-meaning intellectuals, it cannot reach its goals of controlling costs, sustaining quality, and maximizing access to health care ( Meadowcroft, 2003, 319 -22 ) .
VII . DESIGNING AN IDEAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The U.S. mixed market for health care is in such abysmal disarray that repairing it poses substantial political diffi culties. Several factors contribute to political uncertainty. General mistrust of free markets underlies the inability or unwillingness of legislators to recognize the Misesian cycle of futility when they attempt to correct failed command-and-control policies with more central planning. The irrational structure and function of the U.S. health care system has led many if not most Americans into the false belief that they are entitled to health care; this illusion will resist correction. Insurance companies, hospitals, and many producers of health-related products are heavily invested in the current system. These and other factors have created a political milieu in which it will be extremely diffi cult to replace our current dysfunctional system with a rational, effi cient, responsive free market in health care. If such a market is to be achieved, the underlying complex politics will prevent its realization in a single stroke. If market reform occurs at all, it will likely be in the same way the current system was created: by gradual evolution, rolling back a few fl awed policies at a time.
Many visions of the route to a more effi cient, stable, responsive health care market have been presented. None envision a truly free market; rather, they describe how market mechanisms can be used to render the current system more rational ( Butler and Haiselmaier, 1989 ; Goodman and Musgrave, 1992 ; Tanner, 1993 ; Herzlinger, 1997 ; Arnett, 1999 ) . The most urgently needed policy change, in the view of nearly all free market advocates, is correction of the primary error that led health care down the path to our current grievous condition: the IRS decision in 1943 to allow employers to deduct the cost of health insurance premiums as a business expense, while not requiring individuals to report this benefi t as income. The playing fi eld of taxation must be made level for all purchasers of health care insurance. Another positive change would be restructuring health insurance as true indemnity insurance; like most other kinds of insurance, it should cover unexpected, large health care expenses, while the patient pays for routine health care expenses out-of-pocket. Both of these objectives would be addressed by encouraging the use of Health Savings Accounts -tax-free funds to be used to pay routine expenses in combination with catastrophic health care insurance -by freeing them from the politically motivated constraints that encumber them today ( Goodman, 2006 ) . Consumers of health care must come to realize that they are spending their own money when purchasing health care or health insurance, and Health Savings Accounts are a strong fi rst step in that direction. Health insurance should be made affordable for more people by repealing governmentally mandated insurance benefi ts, which unnecessarily drive up the cost of care. Detailed information regarding prices and quality of health care outcomes must be made available by health care suppliers, so consumers can make well-informed decisions. Medicare and Medicaid must be restructured to allow clients to buy insurance and services in the same market as everyone else.
Some have presented pictures of what a market-oriented health care system would look like in the future. Herzlinger (1997) , an early proponent of consumer-directed health care, envisions a market invigorated and dominated by " focused factories " providing integrated care for chronic diseases or frequently performed procedures. Goodman (2001) envisions a market structure similar to the current confi guration, but transformed into a true market by rational tax code reform. The fact of the matter, however, is that the form and function of a free market is fundamentally unpredictable in the long term and is at best uncertain in the short and medium term. Important roles might be played by individual health care providers and by corporate providers in new and innovative confi gurations; we simply cannot know what it will look like or how it will function. The title of the book that described the Clinton administration's health care plan was " The President's Health Security Plan: The Clinton Blueprint. " A blueprint for structure and function may be intellectually satisfying to central planners, but it is precisely what is neither desirable nor possible in a free market. People make myriad choices continually based on evaluation of price and quality; this deluge of information bits dynamically drives the form and function of markets in unpredictable directions that can only be frustrated by rigid blueprints and bureaucracies. Producers, suppliers, and entrepreneurs who are most skillful in making predictions about the needs and preferences of consumers are those who are successful in a free market in the long term. This is as likely to be true of a free market health care as it is of any other market.
Space does not allow a full discussion of what a free market in health care might look like, but perhaps a glimpse would be useful. Generally, there would be few mandated guidelines, rules, regulations, or laws constraining the health care market, only those required by the principle of noninterference. Various participants in such a health care system would have specifi c roles. Governments would create policies or enforce existing laws to protect the freedom of individuals and health care entities to interact with one another without external constraints. Consumers of health care would choose among available preventive and therapeutic services offered by individuals, hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and other provider entities as yet unknown, based on their evaluations of convenience, price, and quality. The markedly increased demand by prudent individual buyers of health care for information on prices, quality of services, and outcomes would compel hospitals, insurance companies, physicians, and other health care providers to make such information available. Should consumers wish to do so, they could evaluate information from suppliers of health care, as well as from evaluation services modeled on existing private evaluation organizations, such as Consumer Reports, Underwriters Laboratories, Michelin travel guides, Zagat reviews of restaurants and hotels, and American Automobile Association ratings.
6 They could also make their choices after considering the advice of trusted health care professionals. Insurance companies, responding to the ever-changing demands of a free market and unconstrained by politically-driven mandates, would create a range of insurance policies with varying benefi ts and prices, refl ecting the varying needs and preferences of consumers rather than those of employers or third parties. Hospitals, health product manufacturers, insurance companies, innovative organizations, and individual or groups of health care professionals would compete on the basis of convenience, price, and quality of care. Those who were truly medically indigent would receive needed health care through voluntary charitable organizations sustained by the genuine benevolence of fellow members of communities bound by common values, such as churches and benevolent secular societies ( Engelhardt, 1996, 398 -403 ) . It will surprise many to learn that there is good reason to believe that freeing the health care economy from its many arbitrary and illadvised constraints is very likely to result in more nearly universal access to health care than under any form of central planning ( Goodman, 2001 ) .
This description of a free market in health care will seem odd to many readers, even though it roughly fi ts many other familiar markets in the United States. This is because of the frequent assertion over several decades that health care has a special character and is of such complexity that ordinary men and women are incapable of understanding alternatives and of making intelligent, informed choices. For example, " There is something radically wrong with treating health care as one more product in a free market economy. It is unrealistic to expect patients to be consumers who will aggressively hunt for the best bargain and be wise in their ' product choice ' " ( Benner, 1998 ) . But health care, in economic terms, is not special (see " Health Care is a Special Case " in Section III above) and no plausible reason has been offered to explain why a market in health care cannot function as effi ciently and unremarkably 7 as the relatively free markets for food and housing in the United States. We cannot design the details of a free market health care system; we can only create the conditions under which such a system can evolve and function effectively because the principle of noninterference is not normative, it is metanormative. The primary goal of government health care policy, based on the metanormative principle of noninterference, should be to protect the freedom of each and every citizen to act on the basis of personal values and goals. Free market institutions are the real-world expression of the freedom to act, either as individuals or as groups in voluntary or contractual association. Legislators and scholars whose goal is to ensure access to high-quality health care at affordable prices would do well to promote market solutions as the most moral and reliable route to reaching those goals.
VIII . CONCLUSION
There should be no doubt that the U.S. health care system has serious problems. Proposed solutions to those problems very widely in the specifi c policies they offer and all have ethical underpinnings, although these are often discussed only perfunctorily or not mentioned at all. Nevertheless, philosophy ultimately drives policy in the long term, so understanding philosophical foundations is critically important to those whose wish to infl uence policy development. This essay is an attempt to increase understanding.
In a certain sense, our health care system is a casualty of war -the price controls of WW II led to the fateful decisions of the IRS (and later the National Labor Relations Board) that created our employer-based health care insurance system. As one fl awed policy led to another, increasingly perverse incentives for patients, physicians, and hospitals led to gargantuan growth of health care costs. Now, most Americans feel as though health care costs them little -most pay out-of-pocket only a few cents on the dollar when they buy health care and some pay nothing at all. In fact, however, employees do pay for the cost of their health insurance in several ways. They pay with reduced wages, invisible because that benefi t never appears in a paycheck. Most importantly, however, they pay with loss of freedom to control their own resources in weighing the value of health care services against all the other goods and values that are important to their health and to their lives.
In arguing their cases, central planners point to the imperfections of free markets, and their criticisms are correct to some extent: free markets are far from perfect. But government-based solutions are also fl awed, a point usually overlooked. As demonstrated in public choice theory, government officials are motivated by self-interest, just as are private individuals ( Buchanan and Tulley, 1962 ) , and their self-interest, infl uenced by a broad range of special interests, is refl ected in the policies they create.
Many arguments for a welfare state draw comparisons between the realworld failings of capitalism, the sociopolitical expression of free markets, and idealized visions of the welfare state ( Seldon, 1990, 220 -49 ) . Such comparisons are -to borrow language from the welfare state literature -patently " unfair. " When comparisons are made between real-world performance of relatively free market economies and real-world performance of heavily regulated economies, such as exist in health care markets in most of the developed world, even partially free economies compare favorably with welfare-based economies, as we have seen in Section VI.
Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, central planners continue to believe that if highly intelligent people were placed in control, they can create government policies that will repair systemic problems. Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest, however, that well-meaning corrective policies cannot repair fl awed policies -they generally make things worse.
There is more interest in the United States for health care system reform now, in 2008, than at any time since the 1994 collapse of the Clintons' American Health Security Act. The vast majority of Americans believe that the system needs fundamental change or complete rebuilding ( Jacobs, 2008 ) ; the vast majority of Americans are probably correct. In this context, the United States has entered a watershed in health care policy. Over the next few years, the path chosen by federal executives and legislators will either continue the Misesian cycle of futile attempts to repair coercive policies or will move toward creating market mechanisms in health care. The free market approach not only offers the nation its best chance for solving its health care problems, it is the only approach that respects our freedom to make our own choices about our health care, our health, and, ultimately, our lives. NOTES 1 . In the modern world a fully realized free market does not exist; some degree of government intervention in markets is always present. In this essay, I use the term " free market " to refer to an economic system in which government intervention is minimal, recognizing that there is a spectrum ranging from minimal intervention, such as in Hong Kong, to complete government control of the economy in fully socialist countries.
2 . See also Machan's discussion of free markets in his monograph, The Moral Case for the Free Market Economy: A Philosophical Argument (1989) .
3 . See especially Machan (1989) , Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991 , 2005 ) , and Kelley (1998) . 4 . The confusion of terminology in the usage of health and health care is manifested in the use of the terms health system, health system reform, and health reform. The concept of health is so broadly inclusive that there is no health system in the United States or anywhere else; there are only health care systems. Moreover, no one has yet offered a proposal for health reform, only for health care reform, or, to be more precise, for health care fi nancing, delivery, or system reform.
5 . In criticizing U.S. health care policy, commentators often observe that nearly all other developed countries utilize some variety of central planning. Resistance to central control of health care in the United States should not be surprising in light of the substantial cultural, social, and political differences between the United States and other nations. Many scholars, most notably Alexis de Tocqueville in the early 19th century, have highlighted these differences, which have remained surprisingly consistent over time. The latest demonstration of American exceptionalism is in the recently published book by Peter H. Schuck and James Q. Wilson (Understanding America: The Anatomy of an Exceptional Nation. 2008. New York, NY: PublicAffairs Books.) 6 . Interestingly, Consumer Reports is about to launch a new hospital rating service based on data from over 3,000 hospitals in the United States (Consumer Reports, 2008 ) .
7 . The proportion of the U.S. GDP that is consumed by the health care sector is now about 16 percent. This statistic is common knowledge among laypersons who read newspapers or magazines and it has been the cause of much hand wringing in the information media and medical literature. Yet, how many well-read laypersons have any idea what proportion of the GDP is expended for food consumption and for housing, which are basic needs? No survey has asked this question, to my knowledge, but I would be stunned if any layperson can give even an approximation of the correct answers. In a free market, expenditures move in directions determined by a host of individual market decisions, and any sector's or industry's share of GDP is what it is; that is, its share is unremarkable. The policy-driven excessive growth in health care's share of GDP in the last forty years is, to the contrary, quite remarkable.
